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Abstract. We address the problem of complying with the GDPR while process-
ing and transferring personal data on the web. For this purpose we introduce an
extensible profile of OWL2 for representing data protection policies. With this
language, a company’s data usage policy can be checked for compliance with
data subjects’ consent and with a formalized fragment of the GDPR by means
of subsumption queries. The outer structure of the policies is restricted in or-
der to make compliance checking highly scalable, as required when processing
high-frequency data streams or large data volumes. However, the vocabularies
for specifying policy properties can be chosen rather freely from expressive Horn
fragments of OWL2. We exploit IBQ reasoning to integrate specialized reason-
ers for the policy language and the vocabulary’s language. Our experiments show
that this approach significantly improves performance.
Keywords: GDPR · Policy language · IBQ.
1 Introduction
The European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) constrains the use of the
personal data of European citizens, no matter where the controller (i.e. the entity that
collects and processes the data) is located. Violations may have severe consequences,
such as significant economic sanctions (4% of worldwide turnover) and loss of reputa-
tion. Therefore companies are looking for methodologies and technologies that support
compliance with the GDPR. The H2020 project SPECIAL addresses these needs in
several ways, including a policy-aware framework consisting of:3
– A semantic policy language for expressing: (i) business policies, i.e. the data usage
policies adopted by the controller; (ii) the consent to data processing granted by the
data subjects; (iii) an axiomatization of the “objective” part of the GDPR.
– A compliance checker capable of verifying whether business policies are compati-
ble with the available consent and with the formalized fragment of the GDPR.
– Explanation facilities for the data subjects and for policy authors.
⋆ This research is funded by the European Unions Horizon 2020 research and innovation pro-
gramme under grant agreement N. 731601.
3 For more details on the overall approach of SPECIAL, see [12, 4].
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The semantic policy language consists of a profile of OWL2 called PL, and vocabu-
laries for expressing policy properties such as the data categories involved in the pro-
cessing, the nature and purpose of the processing, the recipients of the results, and in-
formation about where and how long data are stored. Compliance checking is currently
reduced to subsumption checking in PL [3].
While compliance with respect to the GDPR is a validation phase that takes place
before deploying business policies, compliance checks w.r.t. consent occur at run-time,
in such a way as to allow data subjects to modify or withdraw their consent anytime.
Moreover, many interesting web-based scenarios involve the processing of large vol-
umes of personal data (including various forms of personal data collection, akin to
tracking and fingerprinting) that require scalable, possibly real-time compliance check-
ing w.r.t. the consent policies released by all the subjects which the data refer to. For
these reasons SPECIAL developed a scalable reasoner of PL, called PLR, supporting
103-104 compliance checks per second.
The expressiveness of PL is appropriate for encoding the structure of data usage
policies, licences, and even EHR; however it is too limited for the needs of the associ-
ated vocabularies of properties, considering that concept inclusions in PL are restricted
to class names only. The vocabularies for encoding data usage and GDPR concepts are
being developed independently by the Data Privacy Vocabularies and Controls Com-
munity Group” (DPVCG) of the W3C.4 We intend to put as few constraints as possible
on the development of such standardized vocabularies, because as more application do-
mains are introduced in the vocabularies and more standards (e.g. for classifying con-
trollers) are imported, it is difficult to predict the expressiveness needs that may arise in
their modeling.
In this paper, we address this need by introducing a flexible method for integrating
PL-based compliance checking with more general vocabularies, expressed in Horn-
SRIQ, leveraging the literature on import by query reasoning (IBQ). The IBQ ap-
proach makes it possible to integrate PLR with specialized engines for the logic of the
vocabularies, thereby improving the performance of the available reasoners, and ad-
dressing the aforementioned scalability requirements.
In the next section, we start with technical preliminaries. In Section 4 we apply
(and slightly extend) the theory of IBQ to integrate PL knowledge bases with external
ontologies expressed in Horn-SRIQ (and fragments thereof). Then, in Section 5, we
report our experiments. Software and data can be downloaded from https://1drv.ms/u/
s!Aple1sNCCRUesOEzvzGVRqZnS3uU0Q?e=JHzsyF.
2 Preliminaries
We assume the reader is familiar with the basics on Description Logics (DL) [1], here
we focus only on the aspects needed for this work. The DL languages of our interest are
built from countably infinite sets of concept names (NC), role names (NR), individual
names (NI), concrete property names (NF). A signatureΣ is a subset of NC∪NR ∪NI ∪
NF. An interpretation I of a signature Σ is a structure I = (∆I , ·I) where ∆I is a
4 www.w3.org/community/dpvcg/
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nonempty set, and the interpretation function ·I , defined over Σ, is such that (i) AI ⊆
∆I if A ∈ NC; (ii) RI ⊆ ∆I × ∆I if R ∈ NR; (iii) aI ∈ ∆I if a ∈ NI; (iv) fI ⊆
∆I × N if f ∈ NF, where N denotes the set of natural numbers.
Compound concepts and roles are built from concept names, role names, and the
logical constructors listed in Table 1. We will use metavariables A,B for concept
names, C,D for (possibly compound) concepts, R,S for (possibly inverse) roles, a, b
for individual names, and f, g for concrete property names. The third column shows
how to extend the valuation ·I of an interpretation I to compound expressions. Table 1
also shows the terminological and assertional axioms we deal with. An interpretation
I satisfies an axiom α (in symbols, I |= α) if it satisfies the corresponding semantic
condition in Table 1. As usual, C ≡ D is an abbreviation for the pair of inclusions
C ⊑ D andD ⊑ C. Similarly, disj(C,D), range(R,C) and func(R) are abbreviations
for C ⊓D ⊑ ⊥, ⊤ ⊑ ∀R.C and ⊤ ⊑ (≤ 1R.⊤), respectively.
A knowledge base K is a finite set of DL axioms. Its terminological part (or TBox)
is the set of terminological axioms inK, while its ABox is the set of its assertion axioms.
Table 1. Syntax and semantics of some DL constructs and axioms.
Name Syntax Semantics
Compound expressions
inverse R− {(y, x) | (x, y) ∈ RI} (R ∈ NR)
role
top ⊤ ⊤I = ∆I
bottom ⊥ ⊥I = ∅
intersection C ⊓D (C ⊓D)I = CI ∩DI
union C ⊔D (C ⊔D)I = CI ∪DI
existential ∃R.C {d ∈ ∆I | ∃(d, e) ∈ RI : e ∈ CI}
restriction
universal ∀R.C {d ∈ ∆I | ∀(d, e) ∈ RI : e ∈ CI}
restriction
number (⊲⊳ n S.C)
{
x ∈ ∆I | #{y | (x, y) ∈ SI ∧y ∈ CI} ⊲⊳ n
}
(⊲⊳=≤,≥)
restrictions
self ∃S.Self {x ∈ ∆I | (x, x) ∈ SI}
interval ∃f.[ℓ, u] {x ∈ ∆I | ∃i ∈ [ℓ, u] : (d, i) ∈ fI
restrictions
Terminological axioms I satisfies the axiom if:
GCI C ⊑ D CI ⊆ DI
role disj(S1, S2) S
I
1 ∩ S
I
2 = ∅
disjointness
complex R1 ◦...◦ Rn ⊑ R R
I
1 ◦ . . . ◦ R
I
n ⊆ R
I
role inclusions
Concept and role assertion axioms (a, b ∈ NI)
conc. assrt. C(a) aI ∈ CI
role assrt. R(a, b) (a, b)I ∈ RI
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If X is a DL expression, an axiom, or a knowledge base, then Σ(X) denotes the
signature consisting of all symbols occurring in X . An interpretation I of a signature
Σ ⊇ Σ(K) is a model of K (in symbols, I |= K) if I satisfies all the axioms in K. We
say that K entails an axiom α (in symbols, K |= α) if all the models of K satisfy α.
Given a knowledge baseK and general concept inclusion (GCI) C ⊑ D, the subsump-
tion problem consists in deciding whether K |= C ⊑ D. A pointed interpretation is a
pair (I, d) where d ∈ ∆I . We say (I, d) satisfies a concept C iff d ∈ CI . In this case,
we write (I, d) |= C.
It is straightforward to see that any knowledge baseK defined on the base of Table 1
satisfies the disjoint model union property, that is, if two disjoint interpretations I and
J satisfyK, their disjoint union I⊎J = 〈∆I⊎∆J , ·I⊎J 〉 – where P I⊎J = P I⊎PJ
for all P ∈ NC∪NR∪NF – satisfiesK, too ([1], Ch. 5). This result can be easily extended
to the union
⊎
S of an arbitrary set S of disjoint models.
A knowledge base K is semantically modular with respect to a signature Σ if each
interpretation I = (∆I , ·I) over Σ can be extended to a model J = (∆J , ·J ) of
K such that ∆J = ∆I and XJ = XI , for all symbols X ∈ Σ. Roughly speaking,
this means that K does not constrain the symbols of Σ in any way. A special case
of semantic modularity exploited in [9] is locality: A knowledge base K is local with
respect to a signature Σ if each interpretation I = (∆I , ·I) over Σ can be extended
to a model J = (∆J , ·J ) of K by setting XI = ∅ for all concept and role names
X ∈ Σ(K) \Σ.
Finally, a Horn-SRIQ knowledge base [13, 14] consists of terminological and as-
sertional axioms from Table 1 satisfying the following restrictions: (i) the set of role
axioms should be regular and the roles S, S1, S2 simple, according to the definitions
stated in [10]5, and (ii) GCIs have the following normal form:
C1 ⊓C2 ⊑ D ∃R.C ⊑ D C ⊑ ∀R.D
C ⊑ ∃R.D C ⊑ (≤ 1 S.D) C ⊑ (≥ n S.D) ,
where C,C1, C2, D either belong to NC ∪ {⊥,⊤} or are of the form ∃S.Self, and S is
a simple role. Like all Horn DLs, Horn-SRIQ is convex, that is, K |= C0 ⊑ C1 ⊔ C2
holds iff either K |= C0 ⊑ C1 or K |= C0 ⊑ C2.
3 Semantic Encoding of Data Usage Policies
SPECIAL’s policy language PL is a fragment of OWL2-DL that has been specifically
designed to describe data controller/subject usage policies and to model selected parts
of the GDPR that can be used to support the validation of the controller’s internal pro-
cesses. The aspects of data usage that have legal relevance are clearly indicated in sev-
eral articles of the GDPR and in the available guidelines:
– reasons for data processing (purpose);
– which data categories are involved;
– what kind of processing is applied to the data;
– which third parties data are distributed to (recipients);
5 The definitions are omitted because they are not needed in our results.
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– countries in which the data will be stored (location);
– time constraints on data erasure (duration).
SPECIAL adopts a direct encoding of usage policies in description logics, based on
those features. The simplest possible policies have the form:
∃has purpose.P ⊓ ∃has data.D ⊓ ∃has processing.O ⊓ ∃has recipient.R ⊓
∃has storage(∃has location.L ⊓ ∃has duration.[t1, t2]) .
(1)
All of the above roles are functional. Duration is represented as an interval of integers
[t1, t2], representing a minimum and a maximum storage time (such bounds may be
required by law, by the data subject, or by the controller itself). The classes P , D,
O, etc. are defined in suitable auxiliary knowledge bases that specify the relationships
between different terms.
A policy of the form (1) may represent the conditions under which a data subject
gives her consent. For example if D = DemographicData then the data subject autho-
rizes – in particular – the use of her address, age, income, etc. as specified by the other
properties of the policy.
The usage policies that are applied by the data controller’s business processes are
called business policies and include a description of data usage of the form (1). Addi-
tionally, each business policy is labelled with its legal basis and describes the associated
obligations that must be fulfilled. For example, if the data category includes personal
data, and processing is allowed by explicit consent, then the business policy should have
the additional conjuncts:
∃has legal basis.Art6 1 a Consent ⊓
∃has duty.GetConsent ⊓ ∃has duty.GiveAccess ⊓
∃has duty.RectifyOnRequest ⊓ ∃has duty.DeleteOnRequest
(2)
that label the policy with the chosen legal basis from Art. 6 GDPR, and model the obli-
gations related to the data subjects’ rights, cf. Chapter 3 of the GDPR. More precisely,
the terms involving has duty assert that the process modelled by the business policy in-
cludes the operations needed to obtain the data subject’s consent (∃has duty.GetConsent)
and those needed to receive and apply the data subjects’ requests to access, rectify, and
delete their personal data.
Data controllers and subjects may specify different policies for different categories
of data and different purposes. The result is a full policy P1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Pn where each Pi
is a simple usage policies like (1) or (1) ⊓ (2) (one for each usage type).
Simple usage policies are formalized by simple PL concepts, that are defined by
the following grammar, where A ∈ NC, R ∈ NR, and f ∈ NF :
C,D ::= A | ⊥ | ∃f.[l, u] | ∃R.C | C ⊓D .
A (full) PL concept is a unionD1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Dn of simple PL concepts (n ≥ 1).
In order to check whether a business process complies with the consent given by
a data subject S, it suffices to check whether the corresponding business policy BP
is subsumed by the consent policy of S, denoted by CPS (in symbols, BP ⊑ CPS ).
This subsumption is checked against a knowledge base that encodes type restrictions
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related to policy properties. Such a knowledge base is the union of a main knowledge
base K that specifies the semantics of general terms, such as has purpose or has data,
plus the auxiliary knowledge base O that models the different types of data, purposes,
recipients, etc. according to a specific application domain. An example of the actual
axioms occurring in K is:
func(has purpose) range(has purpose,AnyPurpose)
func(has data) range(has data,AnyData)
disj(AnyData,AnyPurpose) .
Formally, we assume that a main PL knowledge base K is a set of axioms of the fol-
lowing kinds:
– func(R) where R is a role name or a concrete property;
– range(S,A) where S is a role and A a concept name;
– A ⊑ B where A,B are concept names;
– disj(A,B) where A,B are concept names.
In [3] O is expressed in the same way. In the following we are showing how to support
more general auxiliary knowledge bases expressed in Horn-SRIQ.
4 Supporting General Vocabularies with IBQ Reasoning
Our strategy consists in treating the auxiliary ontologies as oracles. Roughly speaking,
whenever the reasoner for PL needs to check a subsumption between two terms de-
fined in the auxiliary ontologies, the subsumption query is submitted to the oracle. Of
course this method, called import by query (IBQ), is not always complete [9, 8]. In the
following, we provide sufficient conditions for completeness.
In SPECIAL’s policy modeling scenario, the main ontology K defines policy at-
tributes, such as data categories, purpose etc. – by specifying their ranges and func-
tionality properties – while the auxiliary ontology O defines the privacy-related vo-
cabularies that provide the range for those attributes. The reasoning task of interest in
such scenarios is deciding, for a given subsumption query q = (C ⊑ D), whether
K∪O |= q. Both C andD are PL concepts (policies) that may contain occurrences of
concept names defined in O.
SPECIAL’s application scenarios make it possible to adopt a simplifying assump-
tion that makes oracle reasoning technically simpler [9, 8], namely, we assume that
neither K nor the query q share any roles with O. This naturally happens in SPECIAL
precisely because the roles used in the main KB identify the sections that constitute
a policy (e.g. data categories, purpose, processing, storage, recipients), while the roles
defined in O model the contents of those sections, e.g. anonymization parameters, rela-
tionships between recipients, relationships between storage locations, and the like.
The IBQ framework was introduced to reason with a partly hidden ontologyO. For
our purposes, IBQ is interesting because instead of reasoning on K ∪ O as a whole,
each partition can be processed more efficiently with a different, specialized reasoner.
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The reasoner for K may query O as an oracle, using a query language QL consisting
of all the subsumptions
A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓Am ⊑ Am+1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ An (3)
such that A1, . . . , An are concept names. We will denote with pos(O) all the queries to
O that have a positive answer, that is:
pos(O) = {q ∈ QL | O |= q} .
The problem instances of our interest are formally defined as follows:
Definition 1 (PL subsumption instances with oracles, PLSO). A PL subsumption
instance with oracle is a triple 〈K,O, q〉 where K is a PL knowledge base (the main
knowledge base),O is a Horn-SRIQ knowledge base (the oracle), and q is a PL sub-
sumption query such that (Σ(K)∪Σ(q))∩Σ(O) ⊆ NC. The set of allPL subsumption
instances with oracle will be denoted by PLSO.
The restriction on the signatures is aimed at keeping the roles ofO separated from those
of K and q, as previously discussed. Oracles are restricted to Horn-SRIQ because (to
the best of our knowledge) it is the most expressive convex and nominal-free logic stud-
ied so far in the literature; it can be proved that convexity is essential for the tractability
of PLwith oracles, and that nominals affect the completeness of IBQ reasoning (we do
not include these results here due to space limitations).
The next lemma rephrases the original completeness result for IBQ [9, Lemma 1]
in our notation. Our statement relaxes the requirements on O by assuming only that it
enjoys the disjoint model union property (originally it had to be in SRIQ). The proof,
however, remains essentially the same, and is omitted here.
Lemma 1. Let K andO be knowledge bases and α a GCI, such that
1. K and α are in SROIQ(D) without the universal role,6 where D is the concrete
domain of integer intervals;
2. The terminological part of O enjoys the disjoint model union property;
3. The terminological part T of K is local w.r.t. Σ(O);
4. (Σ(K) ∪Σ(α)) ∩Σ(O) ⊆ NC.
Then K ∪O |= α iff K ∪ pos(O) |= α .
Using the above lemma, we prove a variant of IBQ completeness for PLSO. The lo-
cality requirement of Lemma 1 is removed by shifting axioms from K to O.
Theorem 1. For all problem instances π = 〈K,O, q〉 ∈ PLSO, let
K− = {α ∈ K | α = range(R,A) or α = func(R) }
O+
K
= O ∪ (K \ K−) .
Then K ∪O |= q iff K− ∪ pos(O+
K
) |= q .
6 The definition of this DL is omitted due to space limits; the only important thing is that PL is
a fragment of SROIQ(D)
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Proof. Since K ∪O = K− ∪ O+
K
, it suffices to show that
K− ∪ O+
K
|= q iff K− ∪ pos(O+
K
) |= q .
This equivalence can be proved with Lemma 1; it suffices to show that K−, O+
K
and
q satisfy the hypotheses of the lemma. First note that K− is a PL knowledge base
and O+
K
is a Horn-SRIQ knowledge base (because, by definition of PLSO, K is in
PL and O in Horn-SRIQ, and the axioms shifted from L to O+
K
can be expressed in
Horn-SRIQ, too). Both PL and Horn-SRIQ are fragments of SROIQ(D) without
U , therefore hypothesis 1 is satisfied by K− and O+
K
. Moreover, both PL and Horn-
SRIQ enjoy the disjoint model union property, therefore hypothesis 2 is satisfied.
Next recall that (Σ(K) ∪ Σ(q)) ∩ Σ(O) ⊆ NC holds, by definition of PLSO. Since
the axioms α ∈ K \ K− (transferred from K to O+
K
) contain no roles (they are of the
form A ⊑ B or disj(A,B)), it follows that
(Σ(K−) ∪Σ(q)) ∩Σ(O+
K
) ⊆ NC ,
that is, hypothesis 4 holds. A second consequence of this inclusion is that K− contains
only axioms of the form range(R,A) and func(A) such that R 6∈ Σ(O+
K
). They are
trivially satisfied by any interpretation I such that RI = ∅. ThereforeK− is local w.r.t.
Σ(O+
K
) and hypothesis 3 is satisfied. ⊓⊔
In the following, let K− andO+
K
be defined as in Theorem 1.
The reasoner for solving PLSO consists in two normalization phases followed by
a structural subsumption check. The first normalization phase splits the intervals in the
left-hand side of the given query q to make it interval safe:
Definition 2 (Interval safety). An inclusion C ⊑ D is interval safe iff, for all con-
straints ∃f.[ℓ, u] occurring in C and all ∃f ′.[ℓ′, u′] occurring in D, either [ℓ, u] ⊆
[ℓ′, u′], or [ℓ, u] ∩ [ℓ′, u′] = ∅.
Assuming that the number of intervals in each simple PL concept in C is bounded by
a constant c, this phase can be computed in polynomial time [3]. The result is denoted
by splitD(C).
The second normalization exhaustively applies the rewrite rules in Table 2 to the
left-hand side of C. It is easy to see that these rules preserve concept equivalence. We
say that a PL concept C is normalized w.r.t. K and O if none of the rules in Table 2 is
applicable. Differently from [3], rule 7 queries the oracle to detect inconsistencies.
The third phase of the reasoning is described in Algorithm 1, that differs from its
counterpart for PL [3] in line 3, where subsumptions are checked by invoking the
oracle. Algorithm 1 accepts elementary (i.e. normalized) concepts:
Definition 3. A PL subsumptionC ⊑ D is elementary w.r.t.K andO if both C andD
are simple, C ⊑ D is interval safe, and C is normalized w.r.t. K andO.
Finally, Algorithm 2 (PLRO) specifies the complete reasoning process for general PL
subsumptions with oracles. PLRO can be proved to be sound and complete by anal-
ogy with [3]. First, it is possible to define a canonical model (I, d) with the following
property:7
7 The definition is similar to [3, Def. 2]; each occurrence of Ai ⊑
∗ A is replaced by(dn
i=1
Ai ⊑ A
)
∈ pos(O+
K
).
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Table 2. Normalization rules for STSO. Conjunctions are treated as sets (i.e. the ordering of
conjuncts is irrelevant, and duplicates are removed).
1) ⊥ ⊓D ❀ ⊥
2) ∃R.⊥❀ ⊥
3) ∃f.[l, u]❀ ⊥ if l > u
4) (∃R.D) ⊓ (∃R.D′) ⊓D′′ ❀ ∃R.(D ⊓D′) ⊓D′′ if func(R) ∈ K−
5) ∃f.[l1, u1] ⊓ ∃f.[l2, u2] ⊓D ❀ ∃f.[max(l1, l2),min(u1, u2)] ⊓D if func(f) ∈ K
−
6) ∃R.D ⊓D′ ❀ ∃R.(D ⊓A) ⊓D′ if range(R,A) ∈ K− and neither A nor ⊥
are conjuncts of D
7) A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓ An ⊓D ❀ ⊥ ifO
+
K
|= A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓An ⊑ ⊥
Algorithm 1: STSO(C ⊑ D)
Input: An ontology O and a PL subsumption C ⊑ D
Output: true ifO |= C ⊑ D, false otherwise, under suitable restrictions
1 begin
2 if C = ⊥ then return true ;
3 if D = A and (A1 ⊓ . . . ⊓An ⊑ A) ∈ pos(O), where A1, . . . , An are the top-level
concept names in C then return true ;
4 if D = ∃f.[l, u] and C = ∃f.[l′, u′] ⊓ C′ and l ≤ l′ and u′ ≤ u then return true ;
5 if D = ∃R.D′, C = (∃R.C′) ⊓ C′′ and STSO(C′ ⊑ D′) then return true ;
6 if D = D′ ⊓D′′, STSO(C ⊑ D′), and STSO(C ⊑ D′′) then return true ;
7 else return false ;
8 end
Lemma 2. If C is a simple PL concept normalized w.r.t. K and O, and C 6= ⊥, then
each canonical model (I, d) of C enjoys the following properties:
a. I |= K− ∪ pos(O+
K
);
b. (I, d) |= C.
Each canonical model of C characterizes all the valid elementary subsumptions whose
left-hand side is C:
Lemma 3. If C ⊑ D is elementary w.r.t. K and O, C 6= ⊥, and (I, d) is a canonical
model of C, then K− ∪ pos(O+
K
) |= C ⊑ D iff (I, d) |= D .
Moreover, by means of canonical models, one can prove that interval safety makes the
non-convex logic PL behave like a convex logic.
Lemma 4. For all interval-safe PL subsumption queries σ =
(
C1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Cm ⊑
D1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Dn
)
such that each Ci is normalized w.r.t. K and O, the entailment K− ∪
pos(O+
K
) |= σ holds iff for all i ∈ [1,m] there exists j ∈ [1, n] such that K− ∪
pos(O+
K
) |= Ci ⊑ Dj .
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Algorithm 2: PLRO(K, C ⊑ D)
Input:K and C ⊑ D such that π = 〈K,O, C ⊑ D〉 ∈ PLSO
Output: true if K ∪O |= C ⊑ D, false otherwise
1 begin
2 construct K− and O+
K
as defined in Theorem 1 ;
3 let C′ be the normalization of C w.r.t.K and O (with the rules in Table 2) ;
4 let C′′ = splitD(C
′) ;
// assume that C′′ = C1 ⊔ . . . ⊔ Cm and D = D1 ⊔ . . . ⊔Dn
// check whether each Ci is subsumed by some Dj
5 for i = 1, . . . ,m do
6 for j = 1, . . . , n do
7 if STSO
+
K (Ci ⊑ Dj) = true then skip to next i in outer loop;
8 end
9 return false
10 end
11 return true
12 end
Now that the semantic properties are laid out, we focus on the algorithms. Roughly
speaking, the next lemma says that STSO
+
K (Alg. 1) decides whether the canonical
model (I, d) of C satisfies D. The lemma can be proved by structural induction onD.
Lemma 5. If C ⊑ D is elementary w.r.t. K andO, C 6= ⊥, and (I, d) is the canonical
model of C, then STSO
+
K(C ⊑ D) = true iff (I, d) |= D .
Finally we can prove that PLRO (Alg. 2) is correct and complete.
Theorem 2. Let 〈K,O, C ⊑ D〉 be any instance of PLSO. Then
PLRO(K, C ⊑ D) = true iff K ∪O |= C ⊑ D .
Proof. D is of the formD1⊔ . . .⊔Dn. Let C1⊔ . . .⊔Cm be the conceptC′′ computed
by lines 2 and 3 of PLRO. We start by proving the following claim, for all i = 1, . . . ,m
and j = 1, . . . , n:
STSO
+
K(Ci ⊑ Dj) = true iff K
− ∪ pos(O+
K
) |= Ci ⊑ Dj . (4)
There are two possibilities. If Ci = ⊥, then clearly K− ∪ pos(O
+
K
) |= Ci ⊑ Dj and
STSO
+
K(Ci ⊑ Dj) = true (see line 2 of Algorithm 1), so (4) holds in this case. If
C 6= ⊥, then note that Ci ⊑ Dj is elementary w.r.t. K and O by construction of C′′
(which is obtained by splitting the intervals of the normalization of C w.r.t. K and O).
Then (4) follows immediately from lemmas 3 and 5.
By (4) and convexity (Lemma 4), we have that lines 5–11 of Algorithm 2 return
true iff K− ∪ pos(O+
K
) |= C′′ ⊑ D. Moreover,C′′ can be equivalently replaced by C
in this entailment, since normalization preserves equivalence. The resulting entailment
is equivalent to K ∪ O |= C ⊑ D by Theorem 1. It follows that Algorithm 2 returns
true iff K ∪O |= C ⊑ D. ⊓⊔
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Using Algorithm 2, it can be proved that if the number of intervals occurring in
each simple PL concept is bounded by a constant c (as in SPECIAL’s policies, where
c = 1), then PL subsumption checking with oracles is in Ppos(O
+).8 Consequently, if
oracles have a tractable subsumption problem, then PLSO with bounded occurrences
of intervals is tractable, too.
5 Experimental Evaluation
In this section we describe a Java implementation of PLRO and compare its perfor-
mance with that of other popular engines. PLRO is implemented in Java and distributed
as a .jar file. The reasoner’s class is named PLReasonerIBQ, and provides a partial im-
plementation of the OWL API interfaces, version 5.x. The package includes a complete
implementation of PLRO, including the structural subsumption algorithm STSO and
the two normalization phases, based on the interval splitting method for interval safety
illustrated in [3] and on the rewrite rules in Table 2. Several optimizations have been
implemented. In the following we will assess two versions of PLRO:
IBQ PLR The basic implementation of PLRO.
IBQ PLR c The calls to the oracle (triggered by normalization rule 6 and line 3 of
STSO) are one of the most expensive parts of the reasoner. In order to reduce their cost,
two caches are introduced, for remembering the results of the oracle queries executed
by the normalization phase and STSO, respectively. This optimization is expected to be
effective due to the nature of the interval normalization phase, that replicates concepts
when intervals are split to achieve interval safety, thereby inducing a large number of
identical oracle queries.
SPECIAL’s engine is tested on sets of experiments where both the main ontologies
K and the PL subsumptions that encode compliance checks are completely synthetic.
On the other hand, the oracles – namely MHC, OntolUrgences and SNOMED CT9 –
have been selected from the real ontologies in the BioPortal repository. The choice of
these ontologies (unrelated to the GDPR domain) is justified by two considerations:
– We need large ontologies in order to assess the scalablity of the engine in the in-
creasingly complex scenarios we expect in the future. The above oracles have been
selected due to their size (cf. Table 3) in order to set up a stress test for verifying
the scalability of PLRO as vocabularies grow.
– PL is well-suited to the representation of electronic health records (EHR), using the
standard HL7 to represent the structure of EHR, and biomedical ontologies (such
as SNOMED) to encode the contents of each section (cf. [5]). So our experiments
evaluate the practical behavior of PL also in the e-health context.
The main knowledge bases K define policy roles (recall that no role from the exter-
nal vocabularies may occur in the business and consent policies, and that class inclusion
8 Here we use the notation for complexity classes with oracles adopted in [18].
9 Note that in order to make sure that the selected ontologies do not violate the expressivity con-
straints of Horn-SRIQ a couple of axioms that make use of more expressive DL constructs
have been dropped.
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Table 3. Size of the real world general vocabularies
MHC OntolUrgences SNOMED CT
Oracle size
classes 7,929 10,031 350,711
roles 8 60 120
concrete properties 3 1 0
func 1 4 0
range 5 37 0
disj 3 17 0
inclusions 13623 12023 239871
equivalent classes 16 112 111262
avg. classification 8.7 11.06 11.7
hierarchy height
max classification 12 16 28
hierarchy height
axioms are all pushed into the oracles). Three ontologies have been generated: one for
each of the three sets of parameters K1–K3 reported in Table 4. Approximately half
of the roles and concrete properties are functional, and half of the roles have a range
axiom. The same table reports the parameters P1, P2 and P3 used to generate the PL
concepts occurring in the queries. Concept size and nesting dominate the correspond-
ing dimensions of the real-world policies occurring in SPECIAL’s pilots. The three sizes
P1, P2 and P3 have different interval length; this parameter influences the probability
of interval splitting during the normalization phase, that has a major effect on complex-
ity. In particular, interval splitting may exponentially inflate the given business policy,
and this is unavoidable (unless P=NP) because unrestricted PL subsumption checking
is coNP-complete [5]. If the maximum number of intervals per simple policies (here-
after #int ) is bounded, then the computation of splitPC (PB) takes polynomial time,
but the degree of the polyomial grows with #int . Although in SPECIAL’s data usage
policies #int ≤ 1 (since storage duration is the only interval-valued property), in our
experiments we also analyze the costs of higher values of #int , in view of possible
future extensions. Note that the value of #int is measured after normalization, since
the rewrite rules may decrease the number of intervals.
In each compliance check PB ⊑ PC , PB is a union of randomly generated simple
business policies. Policy attributes are specified by randomly picking classes from the
oracles. We make sure that every simple policy generated is internally consistent by
discarding inconsistent policies. The consent policy PC is the union of a set of simple
policies P iC (i = 1, . . . , n) generated by modifying the simple business policies in
PB , mimicking a selection of privacy options from a list provided by the controller. In
particular, a random deletion of conjuncts within a simple policy mimicks the opt-out
choices of data subjects with respect to the various data processing activities modelled
by the simple policies. Similarly, the random replacement of terms with a different
term simulates the opt-in/opt-out choices of the data subject w.r.t. each component of
the selected simple policies. More precisely, if the modified term occurring in P iC is a
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Table 4. Size of fully synthetic test cases
Main ontology size K1 K2 K3
classes 0 0 0
roles 10 30 50
concrete properties 5 10 15
avg. func 5 15 25
max func 9 27 45
range 5 15 25
disj 0 0 0
inclusions 0 0 0
equivalent classes 0 0 0
Full concept size P1 P2 P3
#simple pol. per full pol. 10 10 10
max #top-level intersec. 10 10 10
per simple subconcept
depth (nesting) 4 4 4
Simple policy size
#atomic classes 30 30 30
#exist. restr. per level 3 3 3
max. #intervals 8 8 8
max interval length 50 80 150
superclass (resp. a subclass) of the corresponding term in the original business policy,
then the data subject opted for a broader (resp. more restrictive) permission relative to
the involved policy property (e.g. data categories, purpose, and so on). Finally, we also
consider the random addition of new simple policies (disjunct).
The number of queries for each size Pi generated for each vocabulary is 3600 (50
different queries for each combination of generation parameters).
The experiments have been performed on a server with an 8-cores processor In-
tel Xeon Silver 4110, 11M cache, 198GB RAM, running Ubuntu 18.04 and JVM
1.8.0 181, configured with 32GB heap memory. We have not exploited parallelism in
the engine’s implementation.
Concerning the engine used to query the oracle, we used the specialized engine
ELK for SNOMED (that is in OWL2-EL) but we had to use the general engine Hermit
on the other two oracles, since they are too expressive for ELK.10
Performance is not affected by the choice of K1, K2, or K3, therefore we aggregate
their results. We aggregate also the results for P1, P2, and P3, because they influence
#int indirectly; we rather focus on the actual value of#int after normalization.
The main experimental results are reported in Table 5. The optimized version of
PLRO is systematically faster than Hermit for #int < 5. Speedups range approxi-
mately from 3 to 6 times. On a very large oracle like SNOMED, PLRO is almost two
orders of magnitude faster than Hermit, also for higher values of#int (we stopped our
experiments at #int =10). For the two smaller oracles, the effects of the combinatorial
explosion of splitPC (PB) become visible when #int = 5 and Hermit turns out to be
faster. The growth of response time is rather slow until #int = 5 because the cost
caused by the exponential inflation of PB is dominated by the cost of oracle calls, that
do not suffer from the combinatorial explosion as explained in the next paragraph.
The effectiveness of the two caches on performance is illustrated in Table 6. The
table illustrates also the explosion caused by interval splitting as#int grows. The com-
parison of the number of oracle queries issued by the two implementations confirms the
10 In future work we are planning to try also specialized engines for Horn DLs, such as GraphDB
and RDFox.
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Table 5. Hermit vs IBQ PLR c: average time per subsumption check (ms)
#int (# intervals per simple policy)
0 1 2 3 4 5 6
MHA Hermit 143.38 154.56 166.10 165.9 184.7 166.75 165.96
IBQ PLR c 21.77 25.72 30.90 36.84 68.27 188.32 871.97
% 15.18 16.64 18.60 22.20 36.96 112.93 525.40
OntolUrgences Hermit 150.56 162.69 168.51 176.16 167.77 179.55 171.17
IBQ PLR c 33.12 36.50 41.39 52.51 74.13 184.23 1007.84
% 21.99 22.44 24.56 29.81 44.19 102.60 588.79
SNOMED Hermit 12806.00 14168.52 18471.95 17730.64 18165.25 18172.86 17588.85
CT IBQ PLR c 191.46 200.45 202.75 220.76 246.12 377.69 1057.85
% 1.50 1.41 1.10 1.25 1.35 2.08 6.01
hypothesis that most oracle calls are duplicates caused by interval splitting (that may
create, for each simple policy, multiple versions that differ only in the intervals). Then
the caches keep the number of oracle queries almost constant.
Table 6. Effectiveness of optimizations on small/medium and large ontologies
#int # disj. # disj. IBQ PLR # oracle IBQ PLR c # oracle
before after (ms) calls (ms) calls
norm norm
MHA 0 10 10 130.47 1530,23 21.77 41,64
1 10 16,89 142.97 1756,87 25.72 41,84
2 10 43,03 185.76 2720,62 30.90 40,56
3 10 153,97 340.32 6428,17 36.84 40,98
4 10 727,53 1043.25 23729,95 68.27 40,67
OntolUrgences 0 10 10 130,80 1566,80 33,12 101,33
1 10 16,35 145,73 1790,14 36,50 101,34
2 10 43,08 191,23 2783,16 41,39 101,68
3 10 145,19 357,16 6671,05 52,51 100,22
4 10 653,44 1030,05 23270,80 74,13 98,00
SNOMED 0 10 10 359,02 1597,64 191.46 104,68
CT 1 10 16,85 395,31 1845,19 200.45 106,68
2 10 40,32 502,34 2761,74 202.75 104,64
3 10 138,44 887,11 6354,83 220.76 104,13
4 10 677,85 2829,61 25008,38 246.12 104,54
6 Related Work
PL differs from the tractable profiles of OWL2 and from Horn DLs due to intervals,
that constitute a non-convex domain.PLwithout intervals is a fragment of the tractable
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DL Horn-SHOIQ with (reuse)-safe roles (cf. [6, 7]). DLs have been already used as
policy languages, e.g. [19, 11]. These works, however, do not address the encoding of
data usage policies, nor the tractability of reasoning.
In [15–17] the authors propose an ontology, PrOnto, for supporting legal reason-
ing and GDPR compliance checking. Axioms are formulated with nonmonotonic rules
interpreted as in corteous logic programming. The scalability of reasoning is not ad-
dressed in these works. In SPECIAL we favour a DL-based formalization, because it
is particularly well suited to policy comparison (predominant in SPECIAL’s scenarios,
and essential for GDPR compliance and data transfers under sticky policies). In rule-
based languages, policy comparison is generally intractable and even undecidable if
rules are recursive (cf. the discussion in [2]). Moreover, SPECIAL is not addressing
advanced legal reasoning. For example, the compliance check w.r.t. the GDPR is aimed
only at verifying the policy’s internal coherence (e.g. does it contain all the necessary
obligations? Is the legal basis appropriate for the data categories involved?). As a con-
sequence, deontic reasoning and nonmonotonic reasoning – frequently adopted in the
AI-and-law area – lie outside the scope of SPECIAL’s use cases.
7 Conclusions
In summary, IBQ reasoning constitutes an effective approach to extending PL reason-
ing with a wide range of vocabularies, formulated with more expressive logics. The
current experiments are encouraging, and show that the integration of different reason-
ers may significantly increase performance. The benefits of this approach are particu-
larly visible on very large oracles, such as SNOMED. This makes the IBQ approach
particularly appealing for reasoning about EHR.
However, the current performance of PLRO’s implementations is not yet sufficient
for SPECIAL’s scenarios. To address this issue, we are going to investigate whether (and
to what extent) oracles can be compiled into PL knowledge bases, to further speed up
reasoning.
In future work we are also going to complete our experimental analysis by extending
the set of test cases, and by evaluating further engines for querying the oracles, with
aprticular attention to the engines specialized on the Horn fragments of OWL2, such as
OWL2-RL and OWL2-QL.
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